William Mitchell Opinion - Volume 5, No. 1, December 1962 by William Mitchell College of Law
Mitchell Hamline School of Law 
Mitchell Hamline Open Access 
The Opinion 
12-1962 
William Mitchell Opinion - Volume 5, No. 1, December 1962 
Mitchell 
William Mitchell College of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/the-opinion 
Recommended Citation 
Mitchell, "William Mitchell Opinion - Volume 5, No. 1, December 1962" (1962). The Opinion. 8. 
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/the-opinion/8 
This Book is brought to you for free and open access by 
Mitchell Hamline Open Access. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in The Opinion by an authorized administrator 
of Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more information, 





Scholarship Fund Nearly Quadrupled 
Scholarship applicants can have sharply higher hopes of 
receiving aid this year, according to a recent release from 
the dean's office. 
"Our available funds have nearly quadrupled over last 
year's," Dean Stephen R . Curtis stated, "and there is 
strong evidence that we may have even more untapped 
sources ." 
dicated that they had not considered contributions to Wil-
liam Mitchell, only because no one had ever suggested it. 
We were happy to find that they have a strong interest in 
the progress of our school." 
The awards will be announced during November or De-
cember, depending upon when all contributors have in-
formed the college of their intended gifts. A faculty com-
mittee will name the recipients, basing their decisions on 
both academic achievement and financial need. Most funds 
are contributed without restriction as to recipients, giving 
the committee full discretion in its choices. 
The largest single group of contributors, the dean re-
ported, is law firms within the Twin City area. Corporations 
have also made substantial contributions. 
"Our solicitations have only just begun," he said. "The 
response has been most encouraging." "Many attorneys in-
A widely held false conception, according to the dean, is 
that students at evening law schools have no need of schol-
arship aid. "While it is true that most of our students hold 
down full-time jobs, it is also true that a great majority of 
them are supporting families. For some of these, the cost 
of a legal education is almost prohibitive." The dean found 
a high interest in the students' situation among most attor-
neys, once they were apprised of the facts. 
Among the awards from new sources this year are two 
from women's groups interested in the college. The William 
Mitchell Law Wives have announced a $300 tuition award, 
and the Ramsey County Lawyers' Wives Guild has resolved 
to make a contribution. 
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Judge John B. Sanborn Portrait 
· Hangs In School's Front Foyer 
The freshman class this year 
participated in William Mitchell's 
first orientation program. 
The sessions were held Thursday 
and Friday in the week before classes 
started. 
The students were welcomed by 
Dean Curtis. He talked to them 
about the history and operations of 
the school and the responsibilities 
of the students. 
Mr. Danforth talked to the stu-
dents about the adversary system, 
systems of courts and the conduct 
of William Mitchell's Moot Court. 
Mr. Montague discussed the 
sources and forms of law, how to 
study law, the use of the case meth-
od and briefing cases. 
Mr. Green talked to the students 
about the place of law in society, 
the importance of language in the 
work of the law students and law-
yers and the content and use of 
the library. 
Mr. Dulebohn explained some of 
the work the lawyer does, his office 
work and litigation. 
Milton Bix, President of the Stu-
dent Bar Association, talked to the 
By John E. McKendriek 
One of the new additions to the physical plant of the William Mitchell 
College of Law during the past year is the portrait of the Honorable 
John B. Sanborn, which now hangs on the wall opposite the front foyer 
of the building. 
The portrait first appeared last summer at the commencement exer-
cises in June, where it was presented to William Mitchell by Lee H. 
Slater, President of the West Publishing Co. Reportedly, the finished 
painting was partially the product of much diligence on the part of 
Mr. Slater and Dean Curtis, whose task it was to convince Judge San-
born that being photographed for the portrait was in the interest of 
propriety. 
Considering Judge Sanborn's long association with William 
Mitchell College of Law, the presence of his portrait is deemed 
to be most appropriate. From the time of the merger in 1956, 
Judge Sanborn was a trustee and vice president until 1959. 
Formerly, during the period from 1935 to 1956, he was a .trustee and 
eventually the president of the St. Paul College of Law, which with the 
Minneapolis-Minnesota College of Law, was the forerunner of the Wil-
liam Mitchell College of Law. 
Judge Sanborn is also an alumnus of the St. Paul College of Law, 
where he received his LL.B. in 1907. Born in St. Paul on Nov. 9, 1883, he 
has lived in the state all of his life. 
After admittance to the Minnesota bar in 1907, Judge Sanborn prac-
ticed law until 1922. During this time, he served for a few years in the 
Minnesota House of Representatives and later became Commissioner of 
Insurance and a member o_f the Minnesota Tax Commission. 
group about the Student Bar Associ- Presenting the portrait of the Honorable John B. Sanborn to Dean Stephan R. 
ation. Dr. Raymond B. Vander Curtis and the William Mitchell College of Law is Mr. Lee H. Slater. 
Borght talked on our Common Law 
In 1922, Judge Sanborn was appointed as judge of the District Court 
for Ramsey County, where he remained until 1925. He then became 
a United States district judge for Minnesota and, in 1982, he was ap-
pointed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. in the world. 
REVISE MODEL PENAL CODE AND MINNESOTA'S PROPOSED PENAL CODE 
Law Institute Approves Model Penal Code 
By Russell L. Streefland 
The American Law Institute on May 24, 196.i, gave final approval 
to a Model Penal Code that has been under preparation for 10 years. 
The new code encompasses an exhaustive study of the philosophical and 
p. cholo.gital ba es of the criminal law. More important probably than 
any .sin"le provision of the code is its over-all approach . It trie to 
bring a unified and logical. approach to cciminal law, which ha grown 
up in the variou tates b cattered and often inconsistent laws over 
the vears. 
To correct the conspicuous variations in' sentencing that sometimes 
give justice an uneven look, the model code provide three degrees of 
felony for sentencing purposes. Definitions of particular crimes are care-
fully drawn. Disorderly conduct, for example, which now can constitute 
almost anything the state dislikes, is narrowly defined. 
More than 100 pages are devoted in the code to such general 
questions as when the defense of double jeopardy should be avail· 
able, when it is permissible to use force in defense of person or 
property, and when a man is mentally responsible for conunis• 
sion of a crime. 
The code's definition of criminal incapacity by reason of insanity 
has already won wide approval. It provides that a person is not respon-
sible for a crime if, as a result of mental disease or defect, he lacks sub-
stantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform 
it to the law. 
The code takes no position on the question of capital punishment, but 
it does suggest a new procedure for imposing sentence in the states 
which retain the death penalty. The jury would first bring in a verdict 
as to guilt and then in a separate proceeding decide whether there should 
be a death sentence. Unless the jury unanimously agreed, the judge 
could not impose the death penalty. 
THE MINNESOTA CODE 
A re-examination of the criminal law was recently completed in 
Minnesota,' when the Advisory Committee on Recodification of the Crimi-
nal Code of Minnesota released a 579-page report proposing revisions 
to the Minnesota Criminal Code. This report will be submitted to the 
1963 session of the Minnesota legislature. 
The core of the present Minnesota Criminal Code was adopted in 
1885 and has not since undergone serious revision. The proposed code 
presents a sweeping modernization of the criminal law, with special em-
phasis on rehabilitation and restoration of convicted felons to citizen-
ship and de mphasis on the aspects of punishment. 1 · 
For exam.pie, under the new code pre.5entence investigations 
would be mandatory after all felony convictions. They are now 
. optional. 
Diagnostic studies would be required of convicted criminals by the 
State Commissioner of Corrections in cases where the crime carries a 
maximum sentence of 10 years or more, and in cases where the "habitual 
offender" statute is invoked. These studies would be available to the de-
fense attorney. 
Serving on the 22-man Advisory Committee are Prof. Maynard Pirsig, 
Associate Justice William Murphy and Chief Justice Oscar R. Knutson 
of the Minnesota Supreme Court. Justice Murphy is an alumnus of Wil-
liam Mitchell, and Chief Justice Knutson is a member of William Mitch0 
ell's Committee on Professional Responsibility. 
Since his "official" retirement two 
years ago, Judge Sanborn has re-
mained at his post under the title 
of senior judge and still retains a 
full workload. 
Roland J. Faricy, 
'22 Dies 
Sad news has been received of 
the sudden death on November 16, 
of Roland J. Faricy, '22. He prac-
Roland J. Faricy 
ticed law in St. 
Paul for forty years, 
after graduation 
from the St. Paul 
College of Law. He 
was a member of 
the firm of Faricy, 
Moore, Costello and 
Hart and a member 
of the corporation of 
the William Mitchell College of Law. 
He rendered valuable services to 
this school through the years and 
only a few months ago participated 
through his firm in our scholarship . 
program. 
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THE STUDENTS SPEAK: 
Law Student's Role 
Our society is an extremely complex structure. The LAW is the 
cement that holds this complexity together much in the way that cement 
holds a brick building together. If the holding cement is improperly mixed 
or improperly applied the entire building collapses, if indeed it rises 
at all. 
We can reason, therefore, that untrained workers should not under-
take either to mix or apply the cement. Only those workers thoroughly 
trained have the knowledge and skill necessary to ensure that the build-
ing holds together. 
When this theory is related directly to our society, we see that 
it is the student of law who is endeavoring to learn the mixing 
and application processes necessary to society's "holding 
strength." Without the lawyer, the mixing and application could 
never occur. Without this, society would collapse. 
With this in mind, we as law students should see our goal clearly. 
We must recognize the true value of the opportunity that is before us 
and be thankful for it. We must feel the necessity of the law as an intri-
cate and vital aspect of our society. To attempt the study of law 
without realizing the full meaning of its importance to our life would 
be a meaningless task. 
Above all, we must remember that the student of law is the worker 
who is seeking to acquire the necessary knowledge and skill with which 
to mix and apply the "cement" of society. His goal-our goal-is the 
preservation of a way of life. 
-Douglas Wayne Snyder 
Support Student Bar 
The purpose of the Student Bar Association at William Mitchell is 
to promote scholastic achievement among the students, develop under-
standing among the faculty and students, and further the professional 
and social interests of the students. These goals can be accomplished only 
through a coordinated effort between the governing board and the stu-
dents. It is my desire that this year the Student Bar can achieve new 
goals in providing the students the services that are needed. 
Our "smoker" in September was a tremendous success. More than 
200 students showed up at the University Club to meet their friends and 
get acquainted with members of the faculty. 
If any student is finding it difficult to obtain employment, he 
should talk to William Mortensen, Chairman of the Placement 
Bureau. He may be able to help you. 
Martin Conway, chairman of the Welfare and Curricula Committee, 
1s looking into the possibility of adding new machines to our lounge, 
thereby giving the students a better selection of foodstuffs. 
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President Explains SBA Rule 
By Milton Bix a member of the legal pro- fession; it cannot assume the re-
fession. sponsibility that each student must 
I had the opportunity to attend assume himself. 
the 14th annual meeting of the As members of the Student Bar, 
American Law Student Association you have available the ALSA Life 
held this year in San Francisco, Insurance and the opportunity to 
Calif. subscribe to the ABA Journal at a 
Individual Program 
At this year's annuai m€eting, the 
final touches on the Individual 
Membership Program were present-
, d. The establishment of ALSA's 
program is undoubtedly the most 
significant development in the or-
ganization's 13-year history. Now 
law students can voluntarily become 
members of a national legal organi-
zation while still in law school. 
The purpose of the ALSA Annual 
Meeting is to bring together the 
presidents and delegates of the 131 
accredited law schools in the United 
States (representing 40,000 law stu-
dents) to discuss the Student Bar 
Association and its responsibility to 
the student, the school, and the legal 
profession. 
Legal seminars and workshops 
were conducted by members of the 
American Bar Association. The lee-
tures and demonstrations dealt with 
many phases of the legal profession, 
but the main focal point always 
concerned itself with the law and 
its role in society. 
nominal fee. You also have avail-
able the services of an outstanding 
placement bureau . As members of 
the Student Bar you have, in addi-
tion, the opportunity to read a na-
tional award winning publication, 
the William Mitchell Opinion. 
It is unfortunate that students 
fail to take an active role in the 
Student Bar Association. Students 
say they lack the 
time to be active in 
extra-curricular ac-
tivities at a night 
school. I cannot be-
lieve this. Our smok-
er in September at-
tracted more then 
~00 students, and 
This article will deal primarily Milton Bix fraternity member-
The Individual Membership Pro-
gram of the ALSA has several major 
purposes, the prime one being to 
acquaint law students with the im-
portance and value of organized Bar 
participation. Another major pur-
pose is to aid in the strengthening 
of local Student Bar programs, it 
being necessary for a law student to 
be a member of his local Student 
Bar Association before he can be 
eligible for ALSA membership. 
with two subjects: the individual ship is climbing. The time is there--
membership program initiated this it is the desire that is lacking. 
A third purpose also exists - to 
provide a convenient and effective 
means for providing needed services 
to law students in their pre-profes-
sional years. It is axiomatic that 
there be efficiency and economy, as 
,Yell as strength, in numbers. 
year by the ALSA and the role of The American Law Student Asso-
the Student Bar Association in a ciation and the local Student Bar 
law school. It is the purpose of the can only provide the means by 
ALSA to better educate the stu- which the individual student can 
dents with the primary purposes of prepare himself for the legal pro-
the Student Bar program. 
Student Bar Movement 
It is a difficult task to prepare 
students for the legal profession. 
The process of preparing law stu-
dents for the organized legal profes-
sion is the essence of what is termed 
the "Student Bar Movement." Al-
though not licensed practioners, 
law students are members of the 
legal profession and must share its 
exacting responsibilities. The mel.!,ns 
by which the student participates 
in the legal profession is his Student 
Bar Association and the American 
Law Student Association. 
The Student Bar 1nove1nent 
must concentrate on the area 
outside the classroo1n-self-
development of the law stu-
dents, organization activities 
to supplement the:r formal 
education, and responsibility to 
their school. Thus, the Student 
Bar at William Mitchell must 
encourage development by 
each student as he prepares to 
take his place in society as a 
Frosh 131 Strong 
Begin Studies 
Dicta By the Dean 1 
Changes in faculty seem endless and so do their causes. Dur-
ing 1962 we have lost Marshman Wattson and Jeanette Bluhm 
from the full-time faculty, .. farsh through death and J eanette-
thr ugh illne : and part- time in t ructors Hon. Dougla Amdahl, 
horn the pres ure of other re poi ibilitie and Charle G01·do11, 
from his promotion to become A sistant · eneral Coun el of the 
Immigration and Natu ralization ervice in 1ashn1gton . There 
haYe thu far been no addition to the full-time facu lty, but the 
part-time in tructors have been reinforced by _ix e.-xcellent ap-
poiJ1t.ments. Information concerninrr the, e appear ei wher iu 
thi i sue. They contain a healthy admixtw-e of experience and 
youth. 
Faculty From Ten Schools 
The preceding paragraph aroused my curiosity as to how we are 
doing in the matter of the selection of our faculty from the alumni 
of various law schools. Assuming the prerequisite that, in order to be 
considered for a position as a law teacher, one must have received his 
law training in a first class law school, the interest at William Mitchell 
is not whether the prospect comes from one school or another, but 
whether he has the fundamental qualifications of sound education, schol-
arship, character, experience, and the ability to communicate, that are 
necessary to make a really competent teacher. Our faculty has been built 
on that bas:i . A count now disclose that of the 30 men on our faculty 
thi year, eight come f rom '\ illiarn l\litchell, seven from the University 
of Minnesota, six from Harvard, two each from the University of Chi-
cago and the Uraiver-it:y of Michigan and one each from the niv rsity 
of Louvain. Xorthwestern , Marquette. John l\IarshaTI of Chicago and 
Creiahton . Our . tudent are tber fore being il1structcd by men who 
recei\'ed their training in 10 d ifferent law chool . 1 is i:ntere ting to 
kno," that three of the men from William .:.Uitchell are top men from 
recent classes at the school who ar regarded by our faculty committee 
a., prime prospects. 
The December trip to the Minnesota State Prison at Stillwater pro- On September 12, l969?, 131 men One of the sad experiences of the year was the sudden and shocking 
death of Judge Herbert F. Goodrich. _In spite of intense suffering from a 
painful hip condition, the judge made tbc long trip from Philadelphia 
to St. Paul to appear as commencement speaker at our commencement 
on June 12. He and Mrs. Goodrich made many friends here, and his 
address was inspiring. Within less than two weeks he passed away, fol-
lowing what appeared to have been a successful operation on the ailing 
hip. There is no hope of replacing a man like Judge Goodrich. We can 
only be thankful for his life and his long service to the nation and the 
legal profession: Our school is proud of its association with this truly 
great man. 
vided to the students was very successful as was a similar trip held three and two women began their course 
years ago. of study at William Mitchell Col-
Our two sophomore class representatives, Robert Burk and Frank lege of Law. 
O'Meara, are planning a report on the possibility of a lecture series this 
year. In the past students have failed to support and hear outstanding 
speakers. It is an insult to this school to provide speakers for the stu-
dents and have the students fail to show up. I cannot understand why 
students will not give one hour of their time a semester to hear a judge 
or lawyer speak on a topic of interest to all. 
Don't forget the Law Wives Annual Dance. It will be held 
this year at the Commodore Hotel on Feb. 2, 1963. This dance 
has always been the social highlight of the school year. 
Some of the statistics of this 
group are as follows: average age, 
!i!6; married, 65 per cent; age range, 
21-47; average number of children, 
11/2; number from states outside 
:Minnesota, 30 per cent. 
Educational backgrounds are va-
ried and extensive. Approximately 
96 per cent hold one or more degrees 
A word-of thanks to Mr. William Green and Mr. John Dulebohn. from 36 colleges and universities . 
These two respected members of our faculty have never missed a student- Several students have done advanc-
sponsored function. ed work in European universities. 
Take part in the Student Bar-the dividends you reap will be most 
valuable. If you want to work on any of the committees, contact their 
chairmen or any officer of the Student Bar. Our meetings are held the 
first Tuesday of the month in Room 201. Let your voice be heard, it is 
the only way we have in determining what you want. 
The most apathetic student is the one who complains the loudest 
about the way things are run. -Milton Bix 
Occupations include that of ac-
countant, business administrator, 
law clerk, engineer, insurance ad-
juster and consultant, tax specialist, 
air force officer, teacher, special 
investigator, physicist, personnel 
counselor and geologist. 
Scholarship Fund Grows 
A most heartening experience has been the willingness of law firms 
and corporations to respond to our very spotty efforts to increase the 
chool' chola.r~hip fund. Time bas permitted only a few calls yet the 
fund has _increru;ed four-fold ince la t year. The n ed for scholar hip-
i- great. and we hope to increase our effort . It has been extremely grat i-
fying to have the \,Villiam l\fitchell Law Wive and the Ramsey County 
Lawyers' Wi es participat in our cholorship program. 
A school improvement that has been long anticipated is occurring 
this fall. This is the attractive landscaping of the building grounds. It 
has been made possible through funds given by our generous friends and 
supporters, the executives of West Publishing Company. They are thus 
credited with another important step in the improvement of William 
Mitchell. -
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Controversial Holdings Seen on Freeway Access 
By Floyd B. Olson 
Almost twenty years before Minnesota became a state, the first Amer-
ican case was decided in which it was recognized that an abutting prop-
erty owner had private rights in the adjacent streets.' From that time on, 
courts have been intermittently confronted by litigation requiring more 
precise definitions of those rights when the state or its political subdivisions 
have exercised the police power and the power of eminent domain. Since 
the advent of the controlled access highway, and more especially since the 
development of the National System of Interstate and Defense Highways; 
the problem has been one of particular interest to property owners and 
practicing attorneys. 
Earlier courts believed that all roads were established to service the 
adjoining land.3 By 1949 the concept began to change,' allowing the courts 
of several states to hold that where no highway previously existed the 
construction of an interstate highway gave no right of access to the abut-
ting owner." More recently, South Dakota has followed the trend in 
Darnall v. State.• I 
The Darnalls had commenced in-
verse condemnation proceedings 
against the State of South Dakota 
and its Highway Commission to re-
cover for a claimed taking of ac-
cess. They had established a cafe, 
cabin, and service station business 
on their property, which abutted a 
single highway known as U.S. High-
way 14 and State Highway 79. Mo-
torists and truckers had direct ac-
cess to the establishment. On the 
side of the highway farther from 
the landowners' property, and ad-
jacent to that highway, a new con-
trolled access interstate highway 
was constructed; and between the 
new and old highways a concrete 
curb and gutter were built, thereby 
preventing ingress and egress to the 
new interstate road, except at in-
terchanges about one mile to the 
north and south of the subject prop-
erty. The old highway and the Dar-
nalls' access to it were not disturbed. 
The jury believed that the Darnalls 
had sustained damages amounting 
to $7,000. 
On appeal, the State Supreme 
Court reversed and held that there 
was no taking of access from the 
lanrlowners' property; that the con-
trolled acc~·,,:-.highway which result-
ed in a -diversion of traffic from the 
old highway and the circuitous route 
to get to the property was not a 
taking for which compensation had 
to be paid. The court reasoned that 
since there was no physical taking 
of the landowners' property, or loss 
of access from the old road on which 
the property abutted, the lack of 
direct access to and from the new 
interstate was not special to the 
property owners, but was the result 
of a proper exercise of the police 
power to be complied with by the 
public generally. 
The fundamental problem in the 
Darnall case, as in every case in-
volving interference with the right 
of access, is to reconcile conflicting 
public and private right, (s) 7 and to 
determine by what power of the state 
this should be done. Often the ques-
1 Lexington and Ohio Ry. Co. v. Apple-
gate, 8 Dana 289, 33 Am. Dec. 497 (Ky. 
1839). 
2 The 41,000 mile network of federal 
roads scheduled for completion by 1972. It 
is estimated that in every year after 1972, 
over 5,000 persons will be saved who other-
wise would have died in traffic accidents. 
Prisk, Charles W., Benefits of the Interstate 
System, Traffic Engineering, Feb. 1962, Pp. 
11-12. 
3 3 Stan. L. Rev. 298 (1951). 
1 City of Los Angeles v. Geiger, 94 Cal. 
App. 2d 348, 210 P. 2d 717 (1949). 
0 Smick v. Commonwealth, 268 S.W. 2d 
424 (Ky. 1954); State v. Burke, 200 Ore. 211, 
265 P. 2d 783 (1954); State v. Clevenger, 365 
Mo. 970, 291 S.W. 2d 57 (1956); South 
Meadow Realty Corp. v. State, 144 Conn. 
289, 130 A. 2d 290 (1957) ; State v. Calkins, 
50 Wash. 2d 716, 314 P. 2d 449 (1957); State 
v. Ralston, 359 P. 2d 529 (Ore. 1961). 
0 108 N.W. 2d 201 (S.D. 1961). 
c Smith v. State Highway Commission, 
185 Kan. 445, 340 P. 2d 259 (1959). 
8 See e.g., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Ma-
hon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); Iowa State High-
way Commission v. Smith, 248 Ia. 869; 82 
N.W. 2d 755 (1957); Smith v. State High-
way Commission, 185 Kan. 445, 346 P. 2d 
259 (1959). 
"Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, Supra, 
note 8. at 413. 
10 Covey, Frank M. Jr., Roadside Protec-
tion Through Access Control, Thesis for De-
gree of Doctor of Juridical Science, U. of 
Wisc., 1960, p. 12. 
n Mugler v. State, 123 U.S. 023 (1887); 
Graham v. Kingwell, 218 Cal. 658, 24 P. 2d 
. as (1933). 
About the Author 
Floyd B. Olson, a senior law 
student at William Mitchell, 
received his B.A. degree, cum 
laude, from Gustavus Adol-
phus College. He has been 
employed by the Minnesota 
State Legislature, by the Dis-
trict Court of Hennepin Coun-
ty, and the Attorney General's 
Office, where he has done legal 
research for the past two years. 
tion of what constitutes a "taking 
or damage" under the power of emi-
nent domain is inextricably woven 
into the question of whether a spe-
cific act causing diminution of prop-
erty value is an exercise of the po-
lice power. Both the police power 
and the power of eminent domain 
are essential attributes of sovereign-
ty without which social order would 
be questionable. On the other hand, 
constitutional limitations, well known 
to judges and lawyers, have been 
placed upon the exercise of these 
powers for the protection of private 
property rights. Some courts have 
expressly recognized that the dis-
tinction is one of degree, depending 
upon the facts of the case, to be de-
cided by weighing the private rights 
infring·ed as against the public rights 
obtained.' The problem "cannot be 
disposed of by general propositions," 
asserted Mr. Justice Holmes. "One 
fact for consideration," he thought, 
"in determining such limits is the 
extent of the diminution."' 
Other cases, however, indicate that 
the courts have searched for gen-
eral propositions, many of which 
appear to be applied with axiomatic 
accuracy in disregard of a weighing 
of the interests involved. One writer 
has suggested that "they are poles on 
a spectrum, and beyond the guide-
lines of reasonableness and suitabil-
ity to the end sought there is no con-
stantly ascertainable dividing line 
between them." 10 
The police power is generally un-
derstood to be the power of the 
state to impose reasonable restric-
tions on private property rights 
12 New York State Thruway Authority v. 
Ashley Motor Court, Inc., IO N.Y. 2d 151, 
218 N.Y.S. 2d 640 (1961). At page 644 the 
court said: ''Even supposing, however, that 
the defendants possessed valid and sub-
sisting property rights which the legislation 
here in issue abrogated, this would not pro-
vide sufficient basis for declaring the stat-
ute unconstitutional. In this connection, it 
is to be borne in mind that it was the very 
construction of the thruway which created 
the element of value in the land abutting 
the road. Billboards and other advertising 
signs are obviously of no use unless there 
is a highway to bring the traveler within view 
of them. What was taken by the regulation, 
therefore was a value in the land which the 
thruway itself had added to the land and 
of this the defendant cannot be heard to 
complain. The police power is 'the least 
!imitable of the powers of government and 
. .. extends to .all the great public needs' 
.... " But see Commonwealth v. Boston Ad-
vertising Co., 188 Mass. 348, 7 4 N .E. 601 
(1905) which held that a municipal regula-
tion forbidding signs within a specific dis-
tance from a public park was invalid as an 
attempt to take property for a public pur-
pose without compensation. 
1• See e.g., Ia. Const., art. I, § 18; Mass. 
Const., part I, art. IO; Mich. Const., art. 
XII, § I; N.Y. Const., art. I, § 7; Wisc. 
Const., art. I, § 13. 
14 See .e.g., Cal. Const., art. I, § 14; Colo. 
Const., art. II, § 15; Mo. Const., art. II, §§ 
20 and 21; Tex. Const., art. I, § 17; Wash. 
Const., art. I, § 16. 
10 S.D. Const., art. VI, § 13. 
10 Minn. Const., art. I, § 13. 
without incurring liability by regu- which, by common law, would have 
lations tending to promote the given a private right of action." 21 
health, welfare, safety, morals, and This more restricted view is the one 
convenience of the public.11 But the adopted in Darnall. Whether "dam-
monotony of the principle does not age" occurred was not determined 
reveal the new content that chang- by the amount of loss, but by the 
ing precedents give to it. Statutes type or kind of loss."' 
prohibiting the maintaining of ad- The frequent difficulty of deter-
vertising signs within five hundred mining whether the damage is spe-
feet of the right of way line of an cial engages the controversy as to 
existing highway have been upheld whether the state has exercised the 
under the police power on the proper power. The question; whether 
ground that they are reasonably re- in a denial of access or limited con-
lated to safety and the preservation trol of access case, is often reduced 
of natural beauty.12 to the kind of damage suffered by 
On the other hand, the concept the landowner. Having decided this, 
of eminent domain has not remained the courts then g·enerally character-
static. The federal and many state ize the circumstances as a "taking 
constitutions 13 provide that private of access" for which compensation 
property cannot be "taken" for pub- must be paid under eminent domain 
lie use without paying just compen- provisions, or as a "diversion of traf-
sation. Since the Illinois amendment fie" 20 or "circuity of travel" 27 which 
in 1870, other states," including the property owner must share with 
South Dakota 10 and Minnesota,'° the general public under the police 
have provided substantially that power. 
private property cannot be "taken Despite the English view that an 
or damaged" for public use without I abutter has the right to immediate 
payment of just compensation. The access from his property to a public 
extent to which these differing emi- 1 highway;• American courts generally 
nent domain provisions affect the have not allowed recovery where the 
rights of property owners is not en- property owner was left with indi-
tirely clear. At . least three views rect access to his property after 
have been expressed as to whether construction had caused a more cir-
the words "or damaged" have ex- cuitous route.2' Thus, in cases in-
tended the rights of property own- volving motels, restaurants, service 
ers under constitutional eminent do- stations, and other businesses de-
main provisions. pendent upon the motoring public, 
First, a superficial reading of the the courts have recognized that 
provisions has led some courts to losses of trade might result from 
the conclusion that any public use more circuitous routes or diversions 
of land which caused ascertainable of traffic. But they have also under-
diminution of the market value of stood that the costs of highway de-
neighboring land, though no prop- velopment might become prohibi-
erty was taken therefrom, consti- tive if they were to :recognize a right 
tuted damage in the constitutional to the traffic passing by such estab-
sense." Most courts, including those lishments.30 The practical question 
of South Dakota 18 and Minnesota,'° before the court in the Darnall case, 
have considered this definition too as in other controlled access cases, 
broad. is whether the landowner's loss is 
SPcond, some conrt>1 h:cive 1Jrlopted one wh;c_li. the benefiting public 
the view that if the injuries inflicted should bear, or whether the claim 
were actionable at common law they if established as precedent would 
would constitute "damage" for pur- impose a burden on the public ex-
poses of eminent domain." At com- ceeding the benefits. If Darnall had 
mon law, property is the right of been affirmed, there would be no 
any person to possess, use, enjoy, legal reason why every businessman 
and dispose of a thing." Thus, any in town should not recover for loss 
interference with that right, regard- to his business when an interstate 
less of a physical taking, would highway by-passes the town. The 
"damage" the property and be com- matter is only one of distance. The 
pensable. This interpretation also adoption of the terms "diversion of 
has been regarded as too sensitive." traffic" and "circuity of travel" in-
Third, many courts have adopted dicates the courts' response to the 
the reasoning of the Supreme Court problem. 
of Illinois in Rigney v. Chicago." Courts have, in addition, conclud-
Perhaps Mr. Justice Mitchell stated ed that the right of access does not 
it most clearly when he said, ". . . include access at all points between 
that to entitle a party to compen- property and an adjacent hig·hway.31 
sation he must have sustained spe- Where an existing highway is con-
cial damage with respect to his prop- verted into a controlled access free-
erty, different in kind from that sus- way, with a single entry way re-
tained by the public generally, and maining for access, the question is 
17 See e.g., Omaha Horse Railway Co. v. ,. 2. "Circuity of travel" is the term used to 
Cable Tramway Co., 32 Fed. 727 (1887); designate the additional distance which an 
McCandless v. Los Angeles, 214 Cal. 67, 4 abutting owner must travel in his use of the 
P. 2d 139 (1931); Jaynes v. Omaha Street highways as a result of the highway design. 
Ry. Co., 53 Neb. 631, 74 N.W. 67 (1898); es Lyon v. The Fishmongers Company, I 
Hanks v. Port Arthur, 121 Tex. 202, ,18 S.W. A.C. 06 2, 684, 685 (1876). 
2d 944 <1932) · 20 Nick v. State Highway Commission, 13 
18 Darnall v. State, 108 N.W. 2d 201 (S.D. Wisc. 2d 560, 109 N.W. 2d 71 (1961); Cara-
1961). zella v. State, 269 Wisc. 593, 71 N.W. 2d 276 
10 See e.(J., Rochette v. Chicago, Milwau- (1955); Darnall v. State, 108 N.W. 2d 201 
kee and St. Paul Ry. Co., 32 Minn. 201, 20 (S.D. 1961); Pennysavers Oil Co. v. State, 
N.W. 140 (1884); Guilford v. Minneapolis 334 S.W. 2d 546 (Tex. 1960). Contra: People 
and St. Louis Ry. Co., 94 Minn. 109, 102 v. Ricciardi, 23 Cal. 2d 390, 144 P. 2d 779 
N.W. 365 (1905); Matthias v. Minneapolis, 09-l3); Hamilton v. Mississippi State High-
St. Paul and Sault Ste. Marie Ry. Co., 125 way Commission, 240 Miss. 895, 128 So. 2d 
Minn. 224, 146 N.W. 353 (1914); Locascio 742 (1961). 
v. Northern Pacific Ry Co., 185 Minn. 281, 30 Darnall v. State, 108 N.W. 2d 201 (S.D. 
24 N.W. 2d (1932). 1961); Pennysavers Oil Co. v. State, 334 
20 Lambert v. Norfolk, 108 Va. 259, 61 S.W. 2d 546 (Tex. 1960). 
S.E. 776 (1908) · 31 Mccann v. Clarke County, 149 Iowa 13, 
211 BL Comm. 138; 2 Austin's Jurispru- 127 N.W. IOU (1910); Wenger v. Kelly, 182 
dence; 3rd Ed., 817, 818. Iowa 259, 157 N.W. 206, IO:; N.W. 449 
22 See Rochette case, footnote 19, where- (1917). 
in Mr. Justice Mitchell said: "No law ever 32 Smith v. State Highway Commission, 
proposed to give indemnity for all losses 185 Kan. 445, 346 P. 2d 259 (1959). 
occasioned by the construction of railroads 33 Id. 
and other public improvements. If it did, it 
would extend indefinitely." 
3< Id. 
35 Id. 
23 102 Ill. 64 (1881). 
24 Rochette v. Chicago, Milwaukee and 36 Howard Johnson of Kingsport, Inc. v. 
St. Paul Ry. Co., 32 Minn. 201 , 20 N.W. 140 City of Kingsport, 192 F. Supp. 2ll (E. D. 
(1884). Tenn.1961). 
2o See also Pennysavers Oil Co. v. State, 
334 S.W. 2d 546 (Tex. 1960) where a service 
station business was lost completely. 
20 41 Diversion of traffic" is the term used 
to designate a reduction in tbe volume of 
the traffic on the highway fronting the abut-
ter's property which is caused by changes 
in the highway system . 
3, See cases cited, note 5, Supra. 
as Jones Beach Boulevard Estate v. Moses, 
268 N.Y. 362, 197 N.E. 313 (1935); State v. 
Ensley, 164 N.E. 2d 342 (1960). 
30 Pennysavers Oil Co. v. State, 334 S.W. 
2d 5.16 (Tex. 1960); Nick v. State Highway 
Commission, 13 Wisc. 2d 560, 109 N.W. 2d 
71 (1961). 
whether the regulation of access un-
reasonably restricts the abutting 
owners' rights.32 If it is found to be 
an unreasonable restriction on the 
abutter's rights, or that the high-
way commission attempted to ac-
quire rather than regulate a portion 
of the owner's access, compensable 
damage occurs.33 Acquisition results 
in absolute control of the portion of 
access taken and future entrances 
may be prohibited along that por-
tion.34 Regulation permits the ,.:()t1rts 
to determine whether a denial of 
future entry is unreasonable."" 
The determination of what is rea-
sonable or unreasonable under the 
police power is not confined to the 
needs of the landowner. It may ex-
tend to the control exercised over 
access rights of others who are sim-
ilarly situated. For example, a mo-
tel and restaurant owner alleged 
that city officials prevented him 
from breaking a curb to allow direct 
access to his business on the ground 
that the highway was to be a con-
trolled access highway. The allega-
tion also stated that property own-
ers similarly situated had direct ac-
cess to the same highway. It was 
held that the complaint on its face, 
"has alleged arbitrary i.n:l discrim-
inatory action on the part -oi tht 
city." 38 
Other limitations on recovery for 
claimed loss of access have been es-
tablished in cases where there was 
no prior access, and in cases where 
the property owners have claimed 
access to both sides of the travelled 
portion of the highway. In the first 
type of case, the controlled access 
highway severs the owner's land 
into two parcels. Courts do not per-
mit recovery for loss of access tc 
the new highway on the theory that 
no access existed before the taking.37 
However, it is arguable that sever-
ance damages would be greater be-
cause the severance by access con-
trol would be greater than it would 
if the highway were not access con-
trolled. In the second type of case, 
a raised centerline strip is construct-
ed, or a sign prohibiting left turn, 
is erected, to prevent motorists from 
crossing into the lane of oncoming 
traffic. Regulations of this nature 
are important to trucking firms and 
drive-ins. Yet they are considered a 
proper exercise of the police power.''' 
The legal problems inherent in 
highways designed for denial or con-
trol of access are likely to remain 
controversial. Contrary to th~ 
Holmes dictum, the fact alone that 
the value on land has -ciin,;,::,i~hed _ 
seems to have had little weight in 
allowing recovery under eminent do-
main."' In an era of transportation 
revolution, a safe and efficient high-
way system is essential. With th(' 
changing concepts of highway use, 
courts should be frank to admit that 
the function of roadways is to fa-
cilitate traffic, not to raise local land 
values. Darnall has contributed 
much to this end. 
Party Speakers 
1/or Law Wives 
By Mrs. Paul Rosenthal 
The William Mitchell Law Wives 
organization began its fourth year 
of operation with a party at the 
school on Sept. !26 to welcome all 
freshman wives and wives of trans-
fer students. 
The first regular me,t.!ng 0£ the. 
group was held Oct. 3. A panel dis-
cussion on "The Role of a Lawyer's 
Wife" was given by Mrs. Douglas 
K. Amdahl, whose husband is Dis-
trict Court judge in Minneapolis, 
and Mrs. George Scott, wife of the 
Hennepin County Attorney. 
At the meeting on November 7 
Charles R. Coulter, a Minneapolis 
attorney, spoke on "Your Liability 
for Your Child's Mischief." 
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Real Property Forfeiture Rule Weaker 
By James Malecki 
"Equity abhors forfeitures." This fundamental concept of justice is 
one of the most venerable maxims of equity ever to be echoed in this 
country or England.1 In countless cases, the courts have not only refused 
to enforce forfeitures, but have also strictly construed forfeiture clauses 
in contracts against the person in whose favor they operate. Despite this 
most formidable wall of law against anything that might even resemble 
a forfeiture, since earliest times there has existed a notorious exception to 
the prohibition of forfeitures rule. This is the exception that allows the 
vendor in an installment contract for the sale of land to retain all install-
ments paid, upon a default by the vendee operating to cancel the contract. 
In a recent Wisconsin case, Uihlein Realty Company v. Downtown De-
_vPb],-.• ient Corporation," this exception was once again affirmed, although 
the court in dicta indicated that its days may be numbered by holding 
that if vendees could prove unjust enrichment of vendor, they might be 
entitled to restitution of payments made prior to default and cancellation. 
In the Uihlein case, plaintiff ven-
dor brought an action in the nature 
of a strict foreclosure asking the 
court to set a reasonable time for 
payment of the amount due from 
defendant vendee under an install-
ment land contract, and in default 
of payment, defendants to be barred 
and foreclosed from all rights and 
interests in the land. Defendants 
answered that to grant strict fore-
closure would result in a forfeiture 
and unjust enrichment of the plain-
tiff, and further counter-claimed for 
restitution of amounts already paid 
under the contract. 
The_J!lnd involved was a parcel 
-of high-value land in downtown Mil-
waukee, the purchase price of which 
was $1,000,000. A down payment of 
$100,000 was made when the con-
tract was executed, and at the time 
of· the default, installments totaling 
$338,000 had been paid, making a 
total of $448,000 paid on the pur-
chase price of $1,000,000. The trial 
court determined that plaintiff's loss 
of bargain damages ( the difference 
between the contract price and the 
market value of the land at the 
time of the defendant's breach) were 
approximately $375,000.3 Although 
the trial court's own finding of fact 
..1v.i\.£ f: h.!!.t -pl!t!.l'!.tif.l' (; d1:un9.g~s ~r.a?rll? 
only $375,000, it granted a judgment 
of strict foreclosure and placed the 
reasonable time for redemption at ten 
months. This judgment had the in-
direct effect of forfeiting all of the 
defendant's previous payments un-
der the contract (a sum of $448,-
000), in excess of the determined 
damages. 
On appeal, the majority in a 
-
1l,rusque affirmance reiterated an 
earlier statement of the court in the 
case of Oconto Company v. Bacon.' 
Concerning the right of a vendor to 
strict foreclosure upon default of 
the vendee: 
... Parties, sho11ld have some re-
- gird and respect for the terms of 
their own contracts and ought to 
make the terms thereof conform 
to their real understanding, and 
not rely wholly or even largely 
upon a court of equity for protec-
tion from their own acts.• 
Contir,uing, the majority character-
ized the strict foreclosure as a mere 
affirmance of the party's contract 
and not a forefeiture. 
About the Author 
James Malecki is a senior 
at William Mitchell. After re-
ceiving his B.A. in Business 
Administration from the Uni-
versity of Minnesota in 1957. 
he served four years in the 
U. S. Navy. He is presently 
a Lieutenant in the U. S. 
Naval Reserve and is em-
ployed by the Pillsbury Com-
pany in Minneapolis as Mar-
keting Brand Manager. 
gesting that this theory has been 
gammg recognition in many juris-
dictions, including Wisconsin." How-
ever, before any relief can be granted 
to the defaulting vendee, he must 
prove that payments already made 
under the contract exceed the ven-
dor's damages as a result of the 
breach. In the absence of what the 
court calls these "special circum-
stances," the right to redeem within 
a reasonable time gives a defaulting 
vendee all the protection he is en-
titled to. In the Uihlein case, the 
concurring opinion held that "spe-
cial circumstances" did not exist 
warranting to the defendant vendee 
further relief beyond the right of 
redemption. This holding was based 
on the contention that defendant's 
inability to redeem implied that the 
property was not worth as much as 
the trial court had determined, or 
at least that the value could not be 
readily converted to money. 
The problems touched upon in 
the principal case were aptly de-
scribed by Professor Ballentine in 
his now famous article on the same 
subject in the Minnesota Law Re-
view, Volume 5 at Page 3~9. 
The law, while looking with 
righteous abhorenee on forfei-
tures, and washing its hands of 
their enforcement, after the 
manner of Pontius Pilate, yet has 
been reluctant to intervene with 
affirmative relief or to formulate 
any principle condemning the 
validity of cut-throat provisions 
when their essence involves for-
feiture. Although the law will not 
assist in the vivisection of the vie-
Th~ concurring opinion adopted a tim, it will permit the creditor to 
more liberal approach, approving the keep his pound of flesh if he can 
theory that a defaulting vendee has carve it himself. 
an equitable right to a remedy pre- What Professor Ballantine wrote 
in 19~1 still remains a fairly accu-
rate description of the state of mod-
ern law on land contracts. By the 
great weight of American authority, 
no relief can be afforded against 
express conditions of a contract for 
the sale of land which inflict for-
feitures upon defaulting vendee, 
even though the default may be 
slight, and the payments already 
made under the contract, or im-
provements made to the land are 
substantial! An example of the 
lengths to which the terms of land 
contracts are enforced by some 
courts, despite extremely inequitable 
results, may be found in Nelson 
Realty Company v. Seaman." There 
the court denied all relief against 
forfeiture even though the vendee 
had been killed in France during 
the war, and his administrator intro-
duced well grounded ·evidence that 
payments already made under the 
contract greatly exceeded the ven-
dor's damages. 
Most of the American law on 
contracts for the sale of land 
evolved primarily from three Eng-
lish decisions.• In examining the rea-
soning of these decisions supporting 
what appears to be a forfeiture, we 
find the courts generally treating 
part payments under land contracts 
as security for the performance of 
the contract, to be forfeited in the 
event of a default by the vendee. 
Extending this theory further, some 
English courts have even held that 
the loss of vendee's payments (in 
excess of vendor's provable dam-
ages) is a punishment of the ven-
dee for his breach.10 
Of course, the law here is equally 
as full of inconsistencies as it is 
elsewhere. In the face of what ap-
pears to be the well established Eng-
lish rule described above, a much 
more liberal rule respecting the for-
f Pit11r<' nf r,i,yments was handed 
down by the English Court in Steed-
man v . Drinkle.11 There the court 
stated that the purchase money paid 
in installments should only be re-
garded as security for the true 
amount of the damages suffered by 
the vendor due to the vendee's 
breach, and therefore all payments 
in excess of these "true" damages 
should be returned to the vendee 
in the event of a non-willful breach 
on his part. The court further ob-
served that if the rule established 
in Howe v. Smith " ( one of the 
keystone cases) were carried to its 
logical conclusion, the penalty for 
breach would become more and 
more severe as the vendee moved 
closer to completion of his obliga-
tions under the contract-a most 
illogical and inequitable result. 
Two distinct lines of cases deal-
ing with the rights of defaulting 
vendees under an installment land 
contract of the usual form 13 have 
developed in this country. The first 
line of cases following the English 
"strict" rule holds that where there 
has been a default, the vendor may 
declare a forfeiture, not only re-
contract form provided by statute in Minne-
sota see, Minn. Stat. Sec. 559.21. 
taining all that the vendee has paid, 
but also regaining possession. The 
second and more liberal line has 
granted varying relief to the default-
ing vendee, depending on the equi-
ties of the particular case. Holdings 
included in the second line have 
been based on any one of three or 
four legal theories. In addition to 
the case law, several states have 
enacted statutes in an attempt to 
regulate the rights of parties to 
land contracts. 
Undoubtedly, the majority Ameri-
can rule, as it now stands, embraces 
the strict rule. However, the senti-
ments expressed by courts in the 
liberal minority are gaining a slow 
but sure foothold on the American 
scene, as is amply demonstrated in 
the concurring opinion of the Uih-
len case." It is not inconceivable 
that the majority rule might some 
day be displaced by a combination 
of statute and case law based on 
the equitable principles contained 
in the present day minority view-
point. The need for such a change 
is well illustrated by the following 
hypothetical. 
Suppose one has contracted for 
the purchase of a house or farm. 
Not being able to pay the entire 
sale price in cash, the purchaser is 
required to enter into some type of 
credit transaction with his vendor. 
A purchase money mortgage may be 
given, but often the mode of financ-
ing chosen is the installment land 
contract (contract for deed) .1• This 
agreement will normally provide 
that no conveyance is to be made 
until all the installments are paid. 
The ordinary installment land con-
tract 10 also usually provides that 
all payments must be made on the 
day that they fall due, and on fail-
ure to pay any installment when 
due, all obligations of the vendor 
shall be at an end, and all previous 
payments forfeited as liquidated 
damages. Let us now suppose that 
the purchaser entered into posses-
sion of the land under the agree-
ment, has been in possession for 
many years, and has made consid-
erable improvements. In the years 
which have passed, the purchaser 
has paid, in installments, almost 
90% of the balance due on the or-
iginal purchase price. On the ap-
pointed day for payment of the last 
installment, our purchaser through 
forgetfulness or by mere accident 
fails to make the payment due. He 
is ready and willing to pay a week 
or even a day later, but he has ad-
mittedly missed payment on the 
day agreed upon. Under the major-
ity American rule, this purchaser 
may, as Professor Ballantine puts 
it, " . . . be doomed to see the 
whole of his estate, the reward of 
years of toil and effort, entirely 
swept away from him in a moment 
by the unbending rule of la,w as to 
forfeiture." 17 
On what theory or theories have 
the courts following the majority 
view based their oft-times seemingly 
harsh decisions? The following have 
been advanced to justify decisions 
venting unjust enrichment, and sug-
1 
______ _ _ _______ _ 
17 Ballantine, Forfeiture for Breach of 
7 Ballantine, Forfeiture for Breach of Contract, 5 Minn. L. Rev. 329 at 346 (1905) . volved, the vendor's remedy may be even 
more efficient, depending on the terms of 
his contract. Compare this to the usual 
mortgage foreclosure proceedings wherein 
the mortgagor has a statutory period of up 
to a year after the foreclosure sale in which 
to redeem. 
1 1 Porn. Eq. Jur. 446. 
2 9 Wis. 2d 620, 101 N.W. 2d 775 (1960) . 
• Market value of the property was given 
three appraisals. Vendor's appraiser-$680,· 
000, Vendee's appraiser-$975,000, Vendee's 
appraiser-$1,000,000. Court settled on a 
value between $875,000 and $900,000. 
1 181 Wis. 538, 195 N. W. 412 (1923) . 
6 Oconto v. Jlacon, 181 Wis. 588, 195 N. 
W .. AJ2. {)_923). 
0 Schwartz v. Syver, 264 Wis. 526, 59 N. 
W. 2d 480 (1958), and Long Investment Co. 
v. O'Donnell. 8 Wis. 2d 291, 88 N. W. 2d 674 
(1954) . In the first case, although denying 
restitution for failure by the vendee to 
prove unjust enrichment, the court did ;,ay 
at page 531 of the report, "We think It well 
to say that we are in accord with the trepd 
of m0dern cases which recognize that when 
the result of retention of monies paid upon 
a contract by a vendee who later repudiates 
his obligation is a clear unjust enrichment 
of the vendor, the vendor may be required 
to return such part of the payments as ex· 
ceeds the loss which the vendee's default 
has caused him." 
Contract, 5 Minn. L. Rev. 329 (1905) . 
8 147 Minn. 35', 180 N. W. 227 (1920) . 
• Saville v. Saville, 1 Peere Wms. 774, 24 
Eng. Rep. 596 (1818). Palmer v. Temple, 9 
l\.d. & F.. 508 (1839). Howe v. Smith, 27 Ch. 
D. 89, C. A. (1884) . 
10 This appears to be rather strong lan-
guage in the face of the widely held propo-
sition that damages awarded in action fo1, 
breach of contract are to be compensatory 
and not punitive. 
11 1 A. C. 275 (1916). 
""27 Ch. D. 89 , C. A. (1884). 
13 That is, a contract containing a for-
feiture clause and making time of the es-
sence. 
u Henry Uihlein Realty Co. v. Downtown 
Development Corp., 9 Wis. 2d 620, 101 N. W . 
2d 775 (1960), 
15 For a discussion of some of the reasons 
which make financing by installment con-
tract desirable and often times necessary, 
see Minnesota Land Contract Law in A c-
tion, 39 Minn. L. Rev. 92, 104 (1940) . 
1• For an example of a fairly typical land 
1• See Lytle v. Scottish American Mort-
gage Co., 122 Ga. 458, 50 S. E. 402, (1905 ) . 
for a comprehensive outline of the theories 
upon which various courts have refused res-
titution of payments already made under 
an installment land contract, when vendee 
is in default. 
19 Ibid. 18. 
20 Ibid. 18. 
21 Ibid. 18. 
22 Ibid. 18. 
23 38 L.R.A. (N. S.) 899, discusses statutes 
27 Most notably in the middle western 
United States, Iowa, Nebraska, Minnesota, 
a nd Wisconsin. In Wisconsin the rule has 
developed through Judicial decision, while 
in Minnesota It has evolved through con-
struction of a statute (Minn. Stat. Sec. 
559.21) . 
aimed primarily at preventing forfeiture 28 83 Harv. L. Rev. 883 (1920) . 
when most of the purchase price has al- 20 Henry Uihlein Realty Co. v. Downtown 
ready been paid. Development Corp. 9 Wis. 2d 775, 101 N. 
2, This analogy is amplified and criti- W. 2d 775, (1960) . 
cized at 2 Wis. L. Rev. 307 (1902) . 30 Oconto Co. v . Bacon 181 Wis. 538, 195 
26 See e.g. Kreuscher v. Roth, 152 Minn. N. W. 412, 40 A. L. R. 175 (1923). 
320, 324, 188 N. W. 996, 997 (1922) and 311 Porn. Eq. Jur. 446. 
Nolan v. Greely, 150 Minn. 441, 442, 185 N. ,. 4 Colum. L. Rev. 423 (1908) . w. 647, 648 (1921) . 
20 Under the usual statute a defaulting 
vendee's rights in the property can be ter-
minated in thirty days or less in a swift and 
Inexpensive action. Where no statute ls In-
.. 1 Alta. 344, (1908) . 
04 Statutes in Minnesota, North Dakota, 
South Dakota, Nebraska, California and 
Maryland are representative. 
imposing forfeitures of installments, 
payments or valuable improvements 
in excess of the vendor's actual dam-
ages.'" 
I. Where a vendee makes de-
fault, he cannot take advantage 
of his own wrong.1• 
2. To allow restitution raises the 
implication that the vendee has 
a reserved right to rescind, a 
right that may or may not be 
exercised by vendee depending 
on what is happening to the mar-
ket value of the land."° 
3. Not to enforce a stipulation 
for forfeiture in the land con-
tract would amount to interfer-
ence with the right of the parties 
to freely contract. :n 
4. Retention of payments already 
made is in the nature of liqui-
dated damagee.21 
In addition, even those courts 
which have adopted the liberal view 
in the adjudication of defaulting 
vendee's claims, admit that there 
are certain grounds upon which res-
titution will be denied to the vendee. 
Generally the following situations, 
if found to exist, will operate to 
deny the vendee's claim: 
l, Where vendor bas not can-
celled or rescinded the contract 
and stands ready to perform, 
2. Where the vendor's damages 
are equal to or greater than the 
payments retained by him after 
cancellation. 
3. Where the express provision 
for liquidated damages is genu-
ine and does not amount to a 
penalty or forfeiture. 
Looking beyond the specific rea-
sons upon which the courts have 
based their so-called "forfeiture" 
rulings, one finds inherent in the 
general pattern of these decisions a 
reflection of the social and economic 
attitudes of the country during the 
periods when the stfr ·i rule found 
its widest application. Each deci-
sion re-affirming the sacredness of 
an individual's contract made at 
arm's length seems to echo the tra-
dition of rugged Yankee individual-
ism in a society and economy for 
the most part free from govern-
mental and court imposed restric-
tions. Thus, as the country moved 
away from the traditional doctrine 
of laissez faire it is only natural that 
the courts should reflect in their 
decisions this basic change in the 
nation's philosophy and attitude to-
wards the government's role in a 
free and democratic society. As a 
small part of this fundamental 
change in outlook, we find an in-
creasing reluctance on the part of 
the courts to enforce by judicial 
decree provisions of installment land 
contracts, which if enforced, will 
work forfeitures. Strengthening the 
case law, several states have en-
acted legislation of one sort or an-
other attempting to provide relief 
to the hapless vendee caught in 
the grips of an iron clad contract.23 
The success of these statutes has, 
as will be seen later, not been too 
spectacular. 
In examining the development of 
the liberal rule, one basic fact can-
( Continued on page 6) 
35 California pvi! Code, Sec. 3275, 
"Whenever by the terms of an obligation, 
a party thereto incurs a forfeiture, or a loss 
in the nature of a forfeiture, by reason of 
his failure to comply with its provisions, he 
may be relieved therefrom upon making 
full compensation to the other party, ex-
cept in a case of a grossly negligent, will-
ful, or fraudulent breach of duty." 
80 Minn. Stat. Sec. 559.21, "When a de-
fault is made In the conditions of any con-
tract for the conveyance of real estate or 
any interest therein, whereby the vendor 
has a right to terminate same, he may do 
so by serving upon the purchaser, his per-
sonal representative or assigns, either with-
in or without the state, a notice specifying 
the conditions in which the default has been 
made, and stating that such contract will 
terminate thirty days after the service of 
such notice unless prior thereto the pur-
chaser shall comply with such conditions 
and pay the costs of service ... If within 
the time mentioned the person served com-
plies with such conditions, and pays the cost 
of service and attorneys' fees a s provided 
December, 1962 
l(NOW YOUR TRUSTEES 
John B. Burl~e 
Leads Busy Life 
)Ir. John B. Burke, a member of 
our Board of Trustees, was born 
in McGregor, Iowa, April 21, 1901 , 
the son of James J. and Mildred 
(Goedert) Burke. 
He married Margaret Barrett, of 
Hastings, Minn., on May 17, 1925. 
They have five children : Mary 




Bradshaw Mintener and William 
Mitchell, grandson of the namesake 
of William Mitchell College of Law, 
have announced the formation of 
a partnership for the general prac-
tice of Law in Washington, D .C. , 
on Sept. 15, 1962. 
Mr. Mitchell is the son of Wil-
liam D. Mitchell, former Attorney 
General of the United States under 
President Hoover. He was a partner 
in Doherty, Rumble, Butler, Sulli-
van and Mitchell, St. P an], from 
1937 to 1953; General Counsel of 
the United States Atomic Energy 
Commission from 1953 to 1957, and 
more recently special counsel to 
Jones, Day, Cockley and Reavis, 
Washington , D.C. 
Mr. Mintener was formerly Gen-
eral Counsel of the Pillsbury Co. 
from 1946 to 1954, Assistant Secre-
tary of the Department of Health , 
Education and Welfare of the Unit-
ed States from 1954 to 1956, and 
more recently counsel to Powell , 
Dorsey and Blum, Washington, D .C . 
(Mrs. Howard Boyer), Patricia 
(Mrs. Warren Kump) , John B. Jr. 
and Margaret (Sister Jeanne Char-
lotte of the Order of the Visitation 
nuns). The Burkes have 15 grand-
children. 
Mr. Burke was educated in the 
parochial schools of Iowa and Min-
nesota . In 1922 he graduated cum 
laude from St. Paul College of Law, 
where he was a member of Phi Beta 
Gamma. 
A former faculty member of St. 
Paul College of Law, Mr. Burke 
taught a course en-
titled Mortgages 
now known as Se-
curity Transactions. 
From 1922 to 
1924, Mr. Burke was 
a title attorney for 
the Federal Land 
Bank of St . Paul. In 
1924 he became chief 
John B. Surke counsel for Minne-
sota Federal Savings and Loan As-
sociation, a position he still holds. 
In 1924 he became a part-
ner in the law firm of Scott 
and Burke, in 1936 a partner 
of Scott, Burke and Scott, and 
in 1962 he was joined by his 
son, John B. Burke, Jr,. in the 
firm Burke, Scott and Burke. 
Mr. Burke is a member of the 
American Bar Association, a past 
president of the Minnesota State 
Bar Association, a past president of 
the Ramsey County Bar Associa-
tion, and a past treasurer of the 
Minnesota Tuberculosis and Health 
Association. He is an active mem-
ber on the Board of Governors of 
the Minnesota State Bar Associa-
tion. 
Practice, Two ·Teaching 
Jobs Keep Forsberg Busy 
The course in Criminal Law is un-
dertaken by law students at William 
Mitchell during their first year of 
studies. It is taught by David C . 
Forsberg, who is not only engaged 
in private practice, but also has a 
second teaching position on the fac-
culty of the University of Minne-
sota Law School. 
"I've always had a desire to do 
some teaching," says Mr. Forsberg. 
He has been fulfilling th;s 
desire at William Mitchell and 
is also teaching a course at the 
University law school in appel-
late advocacy, which consists 
Alumni Officers 
Named at Dinner 
The Sixth Annual Dinner of the 
William Mitchell College of Law 
Alumni Association was held 
Wednesday, June 13, in the Star of 
the North Room of the Raddisson 
Hotel. 
Officers were elected for the asso-
ciation at the dinner. The Honor-
able Ronald E. Hachey was elected 
president, William H. De Parcq, 
vice-president, the Honorable Don-
ald T . Barbeau, secretary, and H ar-
ry L. Holtz, treasurer. 
The classes of 1912 and 1937 were 
honored at the dinner. 
The Alumni Association voted to 
participate in fund-raising for the 
school at the dinner . 
Members of the Alumni Banquet 
Committee were the Honorable 
Douglas K . Amdahl, chairman; Da-
vid E. Mikkelson, Gabriel D. Gian-
cola, John B. Keefe and George 
Scott. 
of writing briefs and making 
oral argwnents, Besides his 
teaching duties, Mr. Forsberg 
is engaged in law practice, as-
sociated with the firm of 
Briggs and Morgan in St. Paul. 
The decision to study law was 
not made by Mr. Forsberg until he 
had completed his undergraduate 
work and was serving in the Army. 
David C. Forsberg 
He had attended 
the University of 
Minnesota, grad-
uating with a B.A. 
in international re-
lations in 1953 . 
While in the service, 
from 1953 to 1955, 
he became interest-
ed in the study of 
law through some 
contact with court martial proceed-
ings. Therefore, in 1955, Mr. Forsberg 
enrolled in law school at the Univer-
sity of Minnesota, graduating with 
honors in 1958. He was in the top 
IO per cent of his graduating class, 
and in the Order of the Coif. He also 
wrote for the Minnesota Law R e-
view as recent case editor. 
At the law firm , he works in the 
litigation department, preparing 
cases for trial. Although only a small 
part of his practice consists of crimi-
nal work, he indicates a keen inter-
est in this field, perhaps partially 
stimulated by his t eaching at the 
school. 
Mr. Forsberg was born and raised 
in this area, and makes his present 
home with his wife and four chil-
dren outside of St. Paul in Wash-
ington County, Woodbury Town-
ship. He is a member of the Ramsey 
County, Minnesota and American 
Bar Associations. 
WILLIAM MITCHELL OPINION 
T..IBTIXG law chool i Jike getting married; eyeryone has 
ome advice on how to make a go of it. ro matter how 
good the advice i though, there is nothing that will replace 
trying thing out for your eU. B efor:e th fir t w ~k ha 
ended in hopele s confusion a :first-year law -tudent will 
have heard fift~- different study technique . even i1 be taJk5 
to no one, walk in tl1e sh.adow , and ·wear· a disgui e. 
The a.dvi er who bas the la. t word on bow to stay in bw 
school will star t. by saying "the most important thing to re-
membe1·' or "the only thing to do is" aud tl1en go on to ay, 
' 'bri f e,~ery ca e.'' 'never: touch a CaJl.lled brief or out-
line, ' 'am1otate," ··J.\Jake su=arie of e· ch -ection of cla,~ 
notes. ' "attend all l cture.,' '' em.inar b"ut with moderation, 
(no bull e 'oru;) practice writing old exams." "be or-
ganized" "keep physically fit. morally traight," and n and 
on. ad nauseam. 
Throughout lh. maze of advic , one doe not have to be 
overly bright to catch one little thread of con istency: it's 
a four-letter word that wear you out, "work.' urpri-ingly 
enough, even though one must do h,i own work it' qu ite 
njoyable to most. and I venture a guess to all that come 
back for the econd Tound. The advice on advice offered 
be.r ·pells -work: li ten up . ior tbat' the m 't word on how 
lo -tay in Jaw -chool. dclitional advice may be obtained 
from other fust-yfilr tudent . 
AXO::S'Y:'lO : 
Repriuted by permission of Hastin olleg of the Law 
Solomon lsenstein Norton L. Armour Alonzo B. Seran Charlton Dietz 
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Under the editorship of Mr. Wil-
liam B. Danforth, the William 
Mitchell faculty members are cur-
rently preparing summaries of re-
cent Minnesota Supreme Court de-
cisions . Beginning in September, 
1962, these summaries appear in the 
"Bench and Bar," the official 
monthly publication of the Minne-
sota State Bar Association. 
This project is the result of a 
suggestion, by Mr. Ronald P. Smith, 
Project Chairman of the State Bar's 
Legal Publications Committee, that 
the faculties of the two law schools 
in Minnesota contribute articles to 
the "Bench and Bar." In discus-
sions with William Mitchell repre-
sentatives it was decided that the 
case summaries would be the spe-
cial project of the William Mitchell 
faculty. 
Mr. Danforth, Professor of Law 
and Assistant Dean at William 
Mitchell, is presently doing the 
preparation work as well as the t'dit-
ing, until a definite format of pre-
sentation can be established. 
Charles L. Langer Marvin J. Green 
Mitchell Welcomes Instructors 
* * * * * * TWO GET NEW ASSIGNMENTS 
By Gary Phleger 
Two members of the present Wil-
liam Mitchell faculty will have new 
teaching assignments this coming 
semester. Mr. William J. Erickson 
will be teaching the course in Con-
flict of Laws and Mr. Roger W. 
Schnobrich will instruct the course 
in Trusts. 
William Mitchell will welcome 
several new faculty members this 
fall and coming semester. 
Mr. Solomon l senstein will be 
teaching the course in Administra-
tive Law the second semester. A 
graduate of Harvard University 
with both an A.B. and LL.B. Mr. 
lsenstein will divide his duties be-
tween teaching and work for the 
Immigration and Naturalization 
Service. He has been an attorney in 
that service for t wenty years and 
was recently transferred to St. Paul 
as regional counsel. 
The course in Taxation of 
Estates is being taught by Mr. 
Norton L. Armour, who has 
served for the past five years 
in the office of the regional 
counsel of the Internal Rev-
enue Service in Boston. Mr. 
Armour is currently associated 
with the firm of Bundlie, Kel-
ley and Torrison in St. Paul, 
and received a B.B.A., M.B.A. 
and LL.B from the University 
of Michigan and an LL.M. in 
taxation from Boston Univer-
sity. 
Mr. Alonzo B. Seran will teach 
the course in Personal Property for 
the second semester. Mr. Seran re-
ceived a B.B .A. from the University 
of Minnesota and an LL.B. from 
William Mitchell, where he gradu-
ated in 1959 ranking number one in 
his class. Mr. Seran is associated 
with the Minneapolis firm of Far-
nand, Lee, Mastor and Hart, as well 
as serving as chairman of the Ju-
nior Bar Section of the Hennepin 
County Bar Association. 
Joining the staff in the second 
semester will be Charlton Dietz, 
who received a B.A. from Macal-
ester College and an LL.B. from is assisting in the instruction m the 
William Mitchell. For the past five course in Legal Research. 
years Mr. Dietz has worked in the Another recent graduate of Wil-
legal department of Minnesota Min- liam Mitchell appointed to the fac-
ing and Manufacturing. He will as- ulty is Mr. Marvin J. Green, who 
sist Dr. Van der Borght m the received his B.A. from the Univer-
course on Antitrust Law. sity of Minnesota and his LL.B. 
Mr. Charles L. Langer is the from William Mitchell, ranking 
most recent graduate to join the number one in his class. Mr. Green 
faculty, since he received his LL.B. is associated with the firm of Meier, 
from William Mitchell last June. Kennedy and Quinn in St. Paul and 
Mr. Langer received a B .B.A. from will teach the course in Business 
the University of Minnesota, and Associations this coming semester. 
Teaching Isn't New 
for Prof. Dulehohn 
John F. Dulebohn, who is cur-
rently teaching the course in Torts 
at William Mitchell, had experi-
ence in teaching while attending the 
law school at the University of 
Minnesota as a student. He explains 
that as a student at the university, 
where he received his LL.B., he 
taught school at Augsburg College 
Prep School to earn his way through 
law school. 
A graduate of Gettysburg College 
with a B.A. degree, Mr. Dulebohn 
was persuaded to come to Minne-
sota by a former college friend who 
lived in this area. 
Upon graduating from law 
school, he was in private prac-
tice for about a year when, as 
Mr. Dulebohn explains, "I 
wanted to see France." He en-
listed in the army and served 
in France, during which time 
he also attended the University 
of Nancy, France, and obtain-
ed a Diploma in Civil Law. 
After returning to private prac-
tice in Minneapolis in 1920, Mr. 
Dulebohn met Dorothy Brown and 
was married . Shortly thereafter, he 
took a position in the legal depart-
ment of the Minneapolis Street 
Railway Co. In this work, Mr. Dule-
bohn handled cases in the l\1unici-
pal and District courts and argued 
appeals before the 
Supreme Court of 
Minnesota. Al-
though he did not 
keep accurate rec-
ords of statistics, 
Mr. Dulebohn es-
timated he had trie~ 
over 1,800 cases for 
John F. Dulebohn this company and 
argued about 18 
cases before the Minnesota Supreme 
Court. In 1947, he was appointed 
general counsel for the transporta-
tion company and served in this 
capacity until 1952. 
Thoughts again turned to teach-
ing for Mr. Dulebohn in 1954, 
when he accepted a position teach-
ing at the Minneapolis-Minnesota 
Colllege of Law and later at the 
William Mitchell College of Law. He 
has taught a variety of courses at 
the law school, including Agency, 
Equity, Evidence, Legal Research 
and Torts. Says Mr. Dulebohn, "If 
a student applies himself to the pro-
gram we have here (at William 
Mitchell) he will be a well-rounded 
individual in the practice of law." 
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Alulllni Briefs 
ByR. W. Rahn 
DEAR ALUMNI: We've had 
excellent response from the re-
cent grads. But how about 
some of you earlier grads? We 
at the school and your fellow 
alumni across the nation 
would be interested in know-
ing what YOU are doing these 
days. So why not drop a card 
or a short note, care of the 
ALUMNI EDITOR, and fill us 
in? 
buyer, assistant to the sales manager, 
sales manager and finally to mem-
ber of the board of directors. He 
was also made president of a sub-
sidiary company in 1956. 
1942 
John C. Chommie, B.S.L., LL.B., 
LL.M., J.S.D., professor of law at 
the University of Miami, has writ-
ten a review of a book titled "Taxa-
tion of Foreign Income" by Bittker 
and Ebb. This review appears in 14 
Stanford Law Review 626. 
1958 
David Mikkelson, formerly en-
gaged in private practice in Minne-
apolis, is now an attorney in the 
civil division of the Hennepin Coun-
WILLIAM MITCHELL OPINION 
ty Attorney's Office. Mikkelson, 
during his years of study at the law 
school, was assistant registrar and in 
that position had much to do with 
the organization of our school in its 
present quarters on Summit Ave. 
1959 
Kenneth D . Siegfried is now a 
partner in the firm of Schroeder & 
Siegfried, Minneapolis, and is con-
tinuing in the practice of patent and 
trademark law. 
1960 
John A. Thabes, who was ad-
mitted to the Minnesota Bar in 
May 1960, was also admitted to 
practice in Florida in June 1961. H e 
is now living in Fort Lauderdale, 
Fla., and is associated with the firm 
of Saunders, Curtis, Ginestra & 
Gore, Atlantic Federal Building, 
Fort Lauderdale, engagfog m 
general practice of law. 
1961 
the 
Kenneth J. Maas Jr., is associated 
with the firm of Firestone, Fink, 
Krawetz, Miley & O'Neill, St. Paul. 
Douglas Heidenreich, who ranked 
first in his graduating class, is with 
the firm of Erickson, Popham, Haik 
& Schnobrich, Minneapolis. 
1962 
Complete information is 
not available from the 1962 
Alumni. The results from the 
recent survey will be pub-
lished in the spring edition 




Dies in June 
Many of those who attended the 
commencement exercises last June 
12 were saddened to learn that the 
Hon. Herbert F. Goodrich, who de-
livered the commencement address 
and received an honorary degree of 
doctor of laws from the William 
Mitchell Board of Trustees, passed 
away two weeks later. 
After participating in the gradua-
tion ceremonies, Judge Goodrich, on 
the following day, flew back to his 
home in Philadelphia, Pa., where he 
underwent a serious operation. Un-
fortunately, complications developed 
and on June 25, he died. 
At the time this goes to press, we 
have an interesting situation involv-
ing two of our alumni-Judge Doug-
las K. Amdahl, Class of 19,51 , and 
Judge Donald T . Barbeau, Class of 
1943. Both men, judges on the mu-
nicipal bench in Minneapolis, would 
like to succeed the late Judge Har-
old N. Rogers, who passed away on 
Oct. 31 of this year. Judge Rogers 
was on the District Bench for the 
4th Judicial District, which you will 
recall is the Hennepin County Dis-
trict Court. Judge Amdahl was ap-
pointed by Minnesota's Gov. Ander-
sen to fill this vacancy, under a con-
stitutional provision for the filling of 
such vacancies for the unexpired 
term. Judge Barbeau, however, was 
elected on the Nov. 6 ballot to this 
same position, under a statutory 
provision providing for the filling of 
such vacancies at the next election. 
As the matter now stands, our two 
alumni will probably have recourse 
to the Minnesota Supreme Court in 
a "friendly suit" to determine who 
should get the judgeship. 
Real Property Forfeiture Rule Weaker 
1922 
Geoffrey P. Mahoney, senior 
member of the law firm of lVIahoney 
and Mahoney, Minneapolis, passed 
away on June 24 after suffering a 
stroke. A native of Ireland, he had 
practiced law in Minneapolis since 
J922. He was active in the Interna-
tional Association of Insurance 
Counsel, Knights of Columbus, 
American Legion and local athletic 
clubs, as well as the county, state 
and national bar associations. 
1926 
Hon. James T . Harrison. chief 
justice of the Supreme Court of 
:Montana, gave the commencement 
address, entitled "The Responsibili-
ties of Citizenship," at the June 
commencement of the :Montana 
School of Mines at Butte, Mont . 
-Chief Justice Harrison was awarded 
the degree of doctor of laws, honoris 
causa, by the school during the com-
mencement exercises. 
1930 
George R. Bohrer has been presi-
dent of Farwell, Ozmun, Kirk & Co. 
since 1958. He came to St. Paul in 
1925 and started with F.O.K. & Co. 
as an order clerk. He attended law 
school out of a desire to have more 
than a high school education, and 
since those days, although he has 
never practiced law, he has 'risen in 
his company through the positions 
of clerk in the buying department, 
(Continued from page 4) 
not be overlooked. A defaulting ven-
dee in seeking restitution of pay-
ments, is rarely in as strong a posi-
tion to ask for affirmative relief, as 
is the vendor, who is usually ready, 
willing, and able to perform his part 
of the bargain. Courts have thus 
often found it difficult to afford any 
sort of affirmative relief to the ven-
dee, especially if there is the slight-
est trace of willfulness or negligence 
in his breach. However, when the 
vendee's breach is the result of ig-
norance, surprise, fraud, accident or 
mistake, he has been given relief, 
e,·en in those courts which adhere 
to the strict rule. Carrying this lib-
erality one step further, some courts 
hold that the reason for default is 
immaterial, if it is not willful, and 
therefore the victim of an economic 
depression, who despite all human 
efforts and best intentions is un-
able to pay, should not be put at 
the mercy of a vendor armed with 
a contract giving him the power to 
work a forfeiture. 
An entirely different tack has 
been adopted by one group of courts 
following the liberal minority rule. 
These courts in refusing to enforce 
forfeiture clauses in installment land 
contracts do so by drawing an an-
alogy between the vendor and ven-
dee under an installment land con-
tract and the relationship of a mort-
gagor and mortgagee, especially 
when the vendee is in possession.24 
The similarities between the rela-
tionships are quite striking, leading 
the courts on more than one occa-
sion to state that the legal relation-
ship of vendor and purchaser under 
an installment land contract is sub-
stantially that of a mortgagee and 
mortgagor."' The only substantial 
difference between the two situa-
tions -appears to be one of remedies. 
Upon default in a lien theory state, 
the vendor has a "quicker" remedy 
than his counterpart, the mortga-
gee:• Because of this dissimilarity 
in remedies, it is only logical that 
the vendee, if given a choice, would 
prefer the mortgage method of fi-
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nancing his purchase. Unfortunately, 
financial limitations usually prevent 
the vendee from exercising this 
choice. He is forced to trade the 
protection inherent in a mortgage 
for the low down payment induce-
ments of the installment land con-
tract. Viewed in this light the posi-
tion of some courts in creating a 
fictional mortgagee/mortgagor rela-
tionship to prevent forfeiture under 
a breached installment land contract 
does not seem altogether unreason-
able. Once having determined that 
a mortgage situation does exist, the 
courts then apply the old equitable 
maxim, "Once a mortgage, always 
a mortgage," and promptly declare 
any forfeiture provisions in the con-
tract void as clogs on the mortga-
gor's (vendee's) right of redemption. 
Not in all jurisdictions has the 
mortgage analogy been used to bene-
fit the defaulting vendee. In a few 
states"' it has been used as double-
edged sword- against the vendee, 
purporting to aid him, but in actu-
ality leaving him worse off than he 
would have been if left to his sub-
stantive rights under ordinary con-
tract law. This rather surprising re-
sult is obtained by first implying 
the existence of a mortgagee/mort-
gagor relationship, and then grant-
ing vendor a remedy of strict fore-
closure against the defaulting ven-
dee. The vendee is said to be pro-
tected because in so doing he is 
granted a period of redemption (us-
ually thirty days or less) which he 
would not be entitled to if left to 
his contractual rights. The practical 
effect, however, is to bar all relief 
for the vendee upon the expiration 
of the period of redemption, includ-
ing any equitable remedy which he 
might have had if the transaction 
had been handled as an ordinary 
contract cancellation. Despite well 
reasoned criticism from reputable 
authority,28 this rule still persists, as 
it did in the Uihlein case,"" with the 
courts that follow it holding that 
the cases have nothing to do with 
forfeiture or relief from forfeiture 
because the vendee, by the terms of 
his contract, has failed to bring him-
self within the field of equitable 
relief.30 
Practically, a court need not cre-
ate a legal fiction such as the mort~ 
gagor / mortgagee relationship to 
grant a defaulting vendee relief 
from forfeiture. Many courts do 
not. All that is really needed is a 
recognition of one of the equity 
court's roost basic functions, the 
power to relieve from forfeiture and 
penalty."' 
The law carefully limits the rem-
edies that a party to a contract may 
provide for by way of liquidated 
damages. If these provisions are in 
any way unreasonable, they will 
quickly be struck down. Often an 
express condition precedent in a 
land contract, such as the stipula-
tion which makes time of the es-
sence, is as penal in nature as an 
unreasonable liquidated damages 
stipulation. There is a growing ten-
dency for courts of law and equity 
to disregard both the form and 
effect of these express conditions 
when they are harsh, penal, and 
provide for a penalty or forfeiture.•• 
The Canadian provinces provide 
many good examples of this chang-
ing attitude on the part of the 
courts towards defaulting vendee's 
rights under an installment land 
contract. In practically all Canadian 
cases, strict foreclosure will not be 
allowed .to destroy a vendee's inter-
est in the land if a forfeiture will 
result. A typical example of the 
courts' attitude towards a vendor's 
claim against his defaulting vendee 
when the claim if enforced by strict 
foreclosure would result in an un-
controverted, unjust enrichment of 
the vendor, is contained in the fol-
lowing excerpt from the opinion in 
Canadian Pacific v . Meadows.83 
"I think the court ought 'in every 
case to consider the interest of 
all parties who may be affected 
by its judgment, and if it can 
do so without injustice to the 
Plaintiff vendor, it has the power 
and ought to exercise it to refuse 
a form of relief to which the 
Plaintiff vendor is pri.ma facie 
entitled and give him another 
form of relief to which he is 
also entitled, if by so doing the 
interests of the other parties will 
thereby be better conserved." 
Goaded by the economic and so-
cial evils of past depressions legis-
latures in many states have passed 
statutes conferring upon courts the 
power to adopt a more liberal ap-
proach by relieving a vendee from 
the harsh provisions of a land con-
tract when the enforcement of those 
provisions would work a forfeiture."' 
Unfortunately the statutes to a large 
extent have been disregarded or 
rendered impotent by judicial inter-
pretation. In some cases, they have 
even been construed against the ven-
dee, the very person whom the 
legislature intended to protect. Gen-
erally, these statutes may be group-
ed into two broad classifications: 
Those statutes which expressly pro-
hibit the enforcement of any con-
tract stipulation which will work a 
forfeiture, the California statute 
being a typical example; 85 and those 
which attempt to modify the harsh 
effect of "time is of the essence" 
clauses and other conditions prece-
dent in installment land contracts 
by prescribing a statutory period of 
time within which the defaulting 
vendee may make good his obliga-
tions under the contract without 
having it cancelled. The Minnesota 
statute is typical of this group.38 
A California case illustrates the 
relative ineffectiveness of these stat-
utes in the protection of vendee's 
rights against forfeiture under in-
stallment land contracts. The case 
was decided soon after passage of 
the California statute, and com-
pletely disregarded it. The court 
held that when there has been a 
default, the vendor may declare a 
forfeiture, retaining all that vendee 
has paid, and also regaining posses-
sion of the Iand.37 This view has 
been maintained consistently in 
California,36 and only recently in 
but a relatively few cases has the 
position of the defaulting vendee 
been strengthened ... 
-Statutes in the second classification 
have also, in most cases, been ef-
fectively gutted by judicial con-
struction of any substantial pro-
tection which the legislatures might 
have intended for the defaulting 
vendee thereunder. These statutes 
have typically been held to create 
a remedy of strict foreclosure for 
the vendor,'0 making tender and 
prayer for specific performance by 
vendee after expiration of the stat-
utory period of redemption inef-
fective." Courts applying this type 
of statute disregard, in most cases, 
the extent of the vendor's damages 
as a result of the breach. As Pro-
fessor Ballantine states, "statutes 
which were designed to afford relief 
against forfeitures have instead be-
come smoothly working devices most 
favorable and convenient to the 
vendor, while depriving the vendee 
of the possible gracious exercise of 
discretion on the part of the court 
when equity should demand it.'.'" 
A conclusion of sorts can be 
drawn, based on the Uihlein case 
and other recent cases similar to it. 
Despite the almost insurmountable 
barrier of stare decisis, a slow trend 
appears to be developing that gives 
the defaulting vendee under an in-
stallment land contract limited relief 
from the sometimes disastrous ef-
fects of his own acts. Hopefully, in 
those states not hindered by re-
strictive legislation, this trend will 
eventually culminate in the prohibi-
tion of all forfeitures under land 
contracts, resulting in unjust enrich-
ment to the vendor. In states such 
as Minnesota, where statutes have 
been interpreted to allow forfeiture, 
positive action on the part of the 
legislature will be needed to correct 
the situation.48 
herein, the contract shall be therebv rein-
stated; but otherwise shall terminate:" 
•1 123 Cal. 1, 55 Pac. 718, 43 L. R. A. 199, 
69 Am. St. Rep. 17, (1898). 
38 For recent cases following the Glock 
view, see: Gattian v. Coleman 86 Cal. App. 
(2d) 266, 194 P . 2d 728, (194,8), and Wilson 
v. Security First Nat. Bank, 84 Cal. App. 
(2d) 427, 190 P. 2d 975 (1948). 
39 Barkls v. Scott, 34 A. C. 153, 208 P. 
(2d) 367, 37 Cal. L. Rev. 704 (1949). 
• 0 International Realty Co. v. Vander-
poel. 127 Minn. 89, 148 N. W. 895 (1914), 
and Olson v. N. P. Ry. Co. 126 Minn. 299, 
148 N. W. 647 (1914). 
"Clarkv. Dye, 158 Minn. 217,197, N. W. 
202 (1924). • 
"5 Minn. L. Rev. 351 (1921). 
43 For an interesting discussion of the 
possible economic effects (primarily an in-
crease ih the size of down payment require-
ments in land contracts) which might result 
from statutory reduction of vendor's rights 
in the event of a default by vendee see 
Minnesota Land Contract Law in Action, 39 
Minn. L. ReY. 92 (1940). 
